| The
passage to be discussed is from St. Matthew's Gospel: "Teach
all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and Son and
Holy Spirit," last chapter. SUMMARY
OF THE FIRST SECTION. 1. How
a person in doubt on any matter, to obtain safety of conscience,
should consult those whose business it is to give instruction in
such matters. 2. After
one in doubt has taken such advice he ought to follow what the wise
have laid down, else he will not be safe. 3. Whether
one in doubt ought, consistently with safety of conscience, to follow
the advice given by the wise in a doubtful matter when they lay
down that to be now lawful which in other circumstances is unlawful. |
4. Whether the
Indian aborigines before the arrival of the Spaniards were true owners
in public and in private law; and whether there were among them any true
princes and overlords.
5. Examination
of the error of those who assert that persons living in mortal sin can
not have ownership of anything at all.
6. Mortal sin
does not preclude civil ownership of the true kind.
7. Whether ownership
is lost by reason of unbelief.
8. The divine
law does not make heresy a cause of forfeiture of the heretic's property.
9. Whether heresy
causes loss of ownership by human law.
10. A heretic
incurs the penalty of confiscation of his property as from the date of
the commission of his offense.
11. But although
the heretic's offense is patent, the fisc may not seize his property before
condemnation.
12. Even though
condemnation issues after the heretic's death, confiscation of property
dates back to the time of the commission of the offense, no matter who
is vested with the property.
13. Sales, gifts,
and all other modes of alienation by a heretic are void as from the date
of the commission of the offense, etc.
14. Whether
a heretic before condemnation is the owner of his property in the forum
of conscience.
15. A heretic
may lawfully live of his own property.
16. A heretic
may make a gratuitous conveyance of his property, as byway of gift.
17. A heretic
whose offense has rendered him liable to process may not convey his property
for value, as by way of sale or dowry.
18. In what
case a heretic may lawfully alienate his property for value.
19. Barbarians
are note preluded by the sin of unbelief or by any other mortal sins from
being true owners alike in public and in private law.
20. Whether
the use of reason is a pre-requisite of capacity for ownership.
21. Whether
a boy can be an owner before he has the use of reason.
22. Whether
a person of unsound mind can be an owner.
23. Inasmuch
as the Indian aborigines were not of unsound mind, they are not
precluded from being true owners on the pretext of unsoundness of mind.
24. These aborigines
were true owners alike in public and in private law before the advent
of the Spaniards among them.
"Teach
all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and Son and Holy
Spirit" (St. Matthew, last chap.). This passage raises the
question whether the children of unbelievers may be baptized against the
wishes of their parents. This question is discussed by the doctors on
the fourth book of the Sententiae, dist. 4, and by St. Thomas,
Secunda Secundae, qu. 10, art. 12, and Tertia Pars, qu.
68, art. 10. The whole of this controversy and discussion was started
on account of the aborigines of the New World, commonly called Indians,
who came forty years ago into the power of the Spaniards, not having been
previously known to our world. This present disputation about them will
fall into three parts. In the first part we shall inquire by what right
these Indian natives came under Spanish sway. In the second part, what
rights the Spanish sovereigns obtained over them in temporal and civil
matters. In the third part, what rights these sovereigns or the Church
obtained over them in matters spiritual and touching religion, in the
course of which an answer will be given to the question before us.
As regards the
first part, it might seem at the very outset that the whole of this discussion
is useless and futile, not only for us who have no concern either to inquire
whether the men in question have conducted their administration with propriety
in every detail or to raise any doubts about that business or to correct
any fault that may have been committed, but also for those whose concern
it is to attend to and administer these matters. Firstly, this may so
seem because neither the sovereigns of Spain nor those at the head of
their councils are bound to make completely fresh and exhaustive examination
of rights and titles which have already been elsewhere discussed and settled,
especially as regards things of which the sovereigns are in bona fide
occupation and peaceful possession; this is so because, as Aristotle says
(Ethics, bk. 3), "if any one were to be continually inquiring,
settlement would be indefinitely postponed"; and sovereigns and their
advisers could not attain security and certitude of conscience, and, if
they had to trace the title of their rule back to its origin, they could
not keep anything they had discovered. Moreover, inasmuch as our sovereigns,
namely Ferdinand and Isabella, who were the first to occupy those regions,
were most Christian, and the Emperor Charles V was a most just and scrupulous
sovereign, it is not to be believed that they did not make a thoroughly
complete and exact investigation into everything that could affect the
security of their estate and conscience, especially in such a great matter.
On these accounts, then, it may seem not only useless but also presumptious
to raise any question about the matter; it is like looking for a knot
in a bulrush and for wickedness in the abode of the righteous.
In meeting this
objection we must bear in mind what Aristotle says (Ethics bk.
3), namely, that just as there can be no questioning or deliberation about
matters either impossible or necessary, so also there can be no moral
investigation about those which are certainly and notoriously lawful and
seemly, or, or the other hand, about those which are certainly and notoriously
unlawful and unseemly. For no one can properly raise a question whether
we ought to live a temperate and brave and upright life or a wicked and
base life, nor whether we ought to commit adultery or perjury, or cherish
our parents, and other matters of this kind. Certainly such discussion
would not be Christian. When, however, some project is on foot concerning
which there is a genuine doubt whether it be good or bad, just or unjust,
it is then advantageous to take advice and to deliberate and to abstain
from premature action before finding out and determining how far it is
or is not lawful. Such is the case with matters which, when viewed from
different sides, look good or bad, as happens in many kinds of barter
and contract and other businesses. And in all these cases the circumstances
are such that, even if the thing in question were in itself lawful, it
would be sinful for any one to do it before deliberating and assuring
himself of its lawfulness; and he would not be excused on the ground of
ignorance, for the ignorance would manifestly not be invincible, since
he does not do what in him lies to inquire into the lawfulness or unlawfulness
of the matter. For in order that an act, the goodness of which is otherwise
uncertain, be good, it must be done in accordance with the investigation
and determination of the wise, it being (Ethics, bk. 2) one of
the conditions of a good act that it be done in accordance therewith.
Accordingly, when, in a doubtful case, the doer omits to take the advice
of the wise, he is without excuse. Nay, even if we grant that the act
in question is lawful in itself, yet, if there be any doubt thereon, the
doer is bound to take the advice, and to act in accordance with the award,
of the wise, even though they be themselves in error.
Accordingly,
if anyone, without consulting the doctors, were to make a contract, concerning
the lawfulness or unlawfulness of which men were doubtful, he would undoubtedly
sin, even though the contract were otherwise lawful and even if the doer
thought so, not, however, on the authority of the wise, but of his own
inclination and judgment. And on the same principle, were one in a doubtful
matter to consult the wise and they were to rule against its lawfulness
and yet he were to follow his own judgment and do the thing, he would
sin even though the thing were otherwise lawful in itself. For example,
suppose a man is in doubt whether so-and-so is his wife and he seeks advice
whether he is bound to render the marital debt or whether it is right
for him to do so, or whether he may exact it from her, and the doctors
reply that it is not at all right, and yet he be led by his wife's affection
and his own desire to refuse to accept that reply and thinks that his
act is lawful, it is certainly sinful for him to approach his wife, although
such approach be lawful in itself (as it really is), because he is acting
contrary to the conscience which he ought to have. For in those matters
which belong to his salvation a man is bound to yield credence to the
teachers appointed by the Church, and in a doubtful matter their ruling
is law. For just as in the contentious forum the judge is bound to judge
in accordance with what is alleged and proved, so in the forum of conscience
a man is bound to base his judgment, not on his own sentiments, but on
demonstrable reason or on the authority of the wise; else his judgment
is presumptuous and exposes him to the risk of going wrong, and indeed
he does err in the very fact. This accords with what was laid down in
the Old Testament (Deuteronomy, ch. 17):
"If there
arise a matter too hard for thee in judgment, between blood and blood,
between plea and plea, between leprosy and not leprosy, being matters
of controversy within thy gates (saith the Lord), thou shalt arise and
get thee up to the place which the Lord thy God shall choose, and thou
shalt come unto the priests the Levites and unto the judges that shall
be in those days and enquire, and they shall show thee the sentence of
judgment, and thou shalt do according to the sentence which they of authority
in that place shall show thee, and according to the judgment which they
shall tell thee thou shalt do, not declining to the right hand or to the
left."
I accordingly
assert that in doubtful matters a man is bound to seek the advice of those
whom the Church has appointed for that purpose, such as prelates, preachers,
and confessors, who are people skilled in divine and human law. For in
the Church some are eyes, some feet, and so on (I Corinthians,
ch. 12); and in Ephesians, ch. 4, "And he gave some, apostles;
... some, evangelists; and some, pastors and teachers," and in St.
Matthew, ch. 23, "The Scribes and the Pharisees sit in Moses'
sent; all therefore whatsoever they bid you observe, that observe and
do." And Aristotle (Ethics, bk. l) lays this down as a precept,
following Hesiod, "The man who is ignorant in himself, yet does not
listen to another in order to know what is good, is a foolish and empty
person."
It is, therefore,
not enough for security of life and conscience that a man should deem
himself to be doing right, but in doubtful matters he must needs rely
on the authority of others whose business is therewith. For it is not
enough that merchants should abstain from doing what they themselves deem
wrong, if they nevertheless enter into illegal contracts without the advice
of the wise. And so I do not agree with Cardinal Cajetan when he says
that if a doubt arises about something which really is lawful in itself
and some preachers or confessors who otherwise have authority to pronounce
thereon declare it unlawful or declare it mortal sin when it is venial,
vet the man who, following his own inclination in the matter, disbelieves
them and determines in his own conscience that it is not a mortal sin,
does not sin.
As an example,
Cajetan takes the use by women of paint and other superfluous adornments,
a thing really not a mortal sin, but which he assumes might be pronounced
a mortal sin by preachers and confessors. If, says he a woman is so given
to such adornment that she does not yield assent to them, but thinks it
lawful or not a mortal sin, she does not commit a mortal sin when she
resorts to such adornment. Now this I declare dangerous. For in those
matters which are necessary to salvation a woman is bound to yield assent
to the wise and she exposes herself to danger if contrariwise she does
what the wise pronounce to be a mortal sin. And, on the other hand, if
in a doubtful matter a man has taken counsel with the wise and has accepted
their ruling that the thing is lawful, he is safe in conscience -- at
any rate until he receives a second opinion and is driven to doubt or
to believe the contrary by a person of such authority, or by reasons of
such cogency, as ought to affect his judgment. This is notorious, for
he does all that in him lies and so his ignorance is invincible.
The premises,
then, establish the following propositions:
FIRST. In doubtful
matters a man is bound to seek the advice of those whose business it is
to give it, otherwise he is not safe in conscience, whether the doubt
be about a thing in itself lawful or unlawful.
SECOND. If after
a consultation in a doubtful matter it be settled by the wise that the
thing is unlawful, a man is bound to follow their opinion, and if he act
contrary thereto he is without excuse, even if the thing be otherwise
lawful.
THIRD. On the
other hand, if after such consultation it be settled by the wise that
the thing is lawful, he who follows their opinion is safe, even if it
be otherwise unlawful.
When, then,
we return to the question before us, namely, the matter of the barbarians,
we see that it is not in itself so evidently unjust that no question about
its justice can arise, nor again so evidently just that no doubt is possible
about its injustice, but that it has a look of both according to the standpoint.
For, at first sight, when we see that the whole of the business has been
carried on by men who are alike well-informed and upright, we may believe
that everything has been done properly and justly. But then, when we hear
of so many massacres, so many plunderings of otherwise innocent men, so
many princes evicted from their possessions and stripped of their rule,
there is certainly ground for doubting whether this is rightly or wrongly
done. And in this way the discussion in question does not seem at all
superfluous and so we get a clear answer to the objection. Moreover, even
if it be granted that there is no doubt about the whole question, it is
no novelty for theological discussions to be instituted on points of certainty.
For we discuss about the Incarnation of our Lord and other articles of
faith. For not always are theological discussions of the deliberative
sort, but frequently they are of the demonstrative sort, that is, entered
upon, not for purposes of deliberation, but of instruction.
But some one
may come forward and say: Although there were at one time some elements
of doubt in this business, yet they have now been discussed and settled
by the wise and so everything is now being administered in accordance
with their advice and we have no need of a fresh enquiry. To such a person
I answer first. God be blessed if it is so; our discussion raises no obstacle
thereto; nor would I raise any new complaints. Secondly, I assert that
it is not for jurists to settle this question or at any rate not for jurists
only, for since the barbarians in question, as I shall forthwith show,
were not in subjection by human law, it is not by human, but by divine
law that questions concerning them are to be determined. Now, jurists
are not skilled enough in the divine law to be able by themselves to settle
questions of this sort. Nor am I sure that in the discussion and determination
of this question theologians have ever been called competent to pronounce
on so grave a matter. And as the issue concerns the forum of conscience,
its settlement belongs to the priests, that is, to the Church. Accordingly
in Deuteronomy, ch. 17, it is enjoined on the king that he take
a copy of the law from the hand of the priest. Thirdly, in order that
the whole of the matter be adequately examined and assured, is it not
possible that so weighty a business may produce other special doubts deserving
of discussion? Accordingly I think I shall be doing something which is
not only not futile and useless, but well worth the trouble, if I am enabled
to discuss this question in a manner befitting its importance.
FOURTH. Returning
now to our main topic, in order that we may proceed in order, I ask first
whether the aborigines in question were true owners in both private and
public law before the arrival of the Spaniards; that is, whether they
were true owners of private property and possessions and also whether
there were among them any who were the true princes and overlords of others.
The answer might seem to be No, the reason being that slaves own no property,
"for a slave can have nothing of his own" (Inst., 2,
9, 3, and Dig., 29, 2, 79), and so all his acquisitions belong
to his master (Inst., 1, 8, 1). But the aborigines in question
are slaves. Therefore the matter is proved; for as Aristotle (Politics,
bk. l) neatly and correctly says, "Some are by nature slaves, those,
to wit, who are better fitted to serve than to rule." Now these are
they who have not sufficient reason to govern even themselves, but only
to do what they are bidden, and whose strength lies in their body rather
than in their mind. But, of a surety, if there be any such, the aborigines
in question are preeminently such, for they really seem little different
from brute animals and are utterly incapable of governing, and it is unquestionably
better for them to be ruled by others than to rule themselves. Aristotle
says it is just and natural for such to be slaves. Therefore they and
their like can not be owners. And it is immaterial that before the arrival
of the Spaniards they had no other masters, for there is no inconsistency
in a slave having no master, as the glossator on Dig., 40, 12,
23, notes. Nay, the statement is expressly made in that passage of the
Digest and it is the expressed case set out in Dig., 45,
3, 36, pr., where it is said that a slave who has been abandoned by his
master and not taken into possession by any one else can be taken into
possession by any one. If, then, these were slaves they could be taken
into possession by the Spaniards.
On the opposite
side we have the fact that the people in question were in peaceable possession
of their goods, both publicly and privately. Therefore, unless the contrary
is shown, they must be treated as owners and not be disturbed in their
possession unless cause be shown.
In aid of a
solution I am loath to recall to notice the numerous utterances of the
doctors on the nature of dominion. I have set them out at length when
commenting on Restitution, 4, dist. 15, and on Prima Secundae,
qu. 62, and I pass them by here for fear they should lead me to omit things
of greater moment. And so let me pass them over in order to observe that,
if the aborigines had not dominion, it would seem that no other cause
is assignable therefor except that they were sinners or were unbelievers
or were witless or irrational.
FIFTH. Now,
some have maintained that grace is the title to dominion and consequently
that sinners, at any rate those in mortal sin, have no dominion over anything.
That was the error of the poor folk of Lyons, or Waldenses, and afterwards
of John Wycliffe. One error of his, namely, that "no one is a civil
owner, while he is in mortal sin," was condemned by the Council of
Constance. This opinion was also held by Armachanus (bk. 10, Adversus
errores Armenorum, c. 4) and in the Dialogue, Defensorium pacis;
and Waldensis wrote to controvert him in his Doctrinale antiquitatum
fidei, vol. I bk. 2, ch. 81 and 82, and vol. II, ch. 3. Armachanus
relies on the fact that such dominion is reprobated by God: "They
have set up Kings but not by me; they have made princes and I knew it
not" (Hosea, ch. 8); and then is added the indictment, "Of
their silver and their gold have they made them idols that they may be
cut off." And so, says he, such persons have no lawful dominion in
the eyes of God. It is certain, however, that all dominion is by divine
authority, for God himself is the creator of everything, and none but
they to whom He has given dominion can have it. Now it is not agreeable
to reason that He should give it to the disobedient and transgressors
of his commandments, just as human princes do not give their property,
such as towns and strongholds, to rebels, and if they have given it to
them, they confiscate it. But we ought to judge about divine things through
the medium of human things (Romans, ch. l). Therefore God does
not give dominion to the disobedient. And in token hereof God at times
removes such from their exalted position, as in the cases of Saul (I Sam.,
ch. 15 and 16), and of Nebuchadnezzar and Balthazar (Daniel, ch.
4 and 5). Again (Genesis, ch. 1), "Let us make man in our
own image and likeness that he may have dominion over the fish of the
sea," etc. It appears therefore that dominion is founded on the image
of God. But the sinner displays no such image. Therefore he has no dominion.
Further, such a one commits the crime of treason. Therefore he deserves
to lose his dominion. Likewise, St. Augustine says that the sinner is
not worthy of the bread he eats. Also, the Lord had given our first parents
dominion over paradise and then deprived them of it because of their sin
(Genesis, ch. 1). Therefore, etc.
It is true that
both Wycliffe and Armachanus speak without distinguishing and seem to
be speaking rather of the dominion of sovereignty which belongs to princes.
But because their reasoning applies equally to all dominion, they seem
to have in view all kinds of dominion generally. And that is how Conrad
(bk. I, qu. 7) understands their teaching, and Armachanus is sufficiently
clear in that sense. Those who would follow their teaching may, therefore,
say that the barbarians had no dominion, because they were always in mortal
sin.
SIXTH. But against
this doctrine I advance the proposition that mortal sin does not hinder
civil dominion and true dominion. Although this proposition was established
in the Council of Constance, yet Almain (4, Dist. 15, qu. 2), following
Ailly, bases an argument in favor of it, on the fact that a person already
in mortal sin who finds himself in extreme need their property by civil
law, and the Pope rules that the same is to hold for the crime of heresy.
And Joannes Andreae seems to hold the same opinion, in his comment on
the afore-mentioned chapter cum secundum leges. And it seems to
be had from the law Manichaeos (Cod., 1, 5, 4), whereby
heretics are precluded from sale or gift or any dealing with their property.
Also, civil laws bind in the forum of conscience, as St. Thomas teaches
(Prima Secundae, qu. 96, art. 4).[1]
TENTH. Let the
third proposition in the course of our exposition be:
A heretic incurs
confiscation of his property from the day of the commission of his offense.
This is commonly held by the doctors and is the ruling in the Directorium
inquisitorum (bk. 3, tit. 9), and also in the Summa of Baptista
de Salis on the word absolutio (§ 17), and it seems settled in
the afore-mentioned chapter cum secundum leges and in the afore-mentioned
law Manichaeos (Cod., 1, 5, 4).
ELEVENTH. A
fourth proposition: Nevertheless, although the offense be manifest, the
fisc can not seize the property of a heretic before condemnation. This
is also generally received, and is the ruling of the aforenamed chapter
cum secundum leges. Nay, it would be contrary to the divine law
and to natural law for a penalty to be enforced before condemnation has
issued.
TWELFTH. It
follows from the third conclusion that, when condemnation has taken place,
even though this be after death, the confiscation dates back to the time
of the commission of the offense, no matter into whose control the property
has come. This corollary is also generally admitted and especially by
Panormitanus in his comment on 3, 5, 1 in VI.
THIRTEENTH.
And a second consequence is that every sale or gift of or other dealing
with such property is void as from the day of the commission of the offense.
And so, when condemnation has taken place, all such dealings are rescinded
by the fisc and the property is taken by the same fisc, even without any
repayment of the price to the purchasers. This, too, is generally admitted,
and expressly so by Panormitanus in the passage just named, and is manifest
from the afore-named law Manichaeos (Cod., 1, 5, 4).
FOURTEENTH.
A fifth proposition: Nevertheless a heretic continues to be owner in the
forum of conscience until he is condemned. This proposition seems to be
at variance with Conrad and with the Directorium inquisitorum and
Joannes Andreae; it is, however, the proposition of Sylvester, under the
word haeresis, I, § 8. Adrian also maintains it, discussing the
matter at some length (Quotlibeta, 6, qu. 2), and Cajetan seems
to hold the same view in his Summa, under the word poena.
The proposition is proved, first, by the fact that this deprivation in
the forum of conscience is a penalty; therefore, it ought in no wise to
be inflicted before condemnation. Nor am I sure whether human law could
effect this at all. It is also proved by what is clear from the above-named
chapter cum secundum leges, namely, that property is confiscated
in the same way by the very fact of an incestuous marriage; as also when
a free woman who has been ravished marries her ravisher. Nay, if any one
fails to pay the accustomed dues on imported merchandise, the goods are
forfeit by the very fact; as also in the case of an exporter of contraband
merchandise, such as arms and iron, to the Saracens. All the details will
be found in the above-named chapter cum secundum leges and in Cod.,
5, 5, 3, and Cod., 9, 13, 1, and in X, 5, 6, 6, and in Dig.,
39, 4, 16 (?). Aye, and the Pope expressly says in the afore-named chapter
cum secundum leges that, just as confiscation takes place in the
cases named, so he intends it to take place in a case of heresy. But no
one denies that an incestuous person and a ravisher and one who supplies
the Saracens with arms and one who does not pay customs remain true owners
of their property in the forum of conscience. Why, then, does not a heretic
also? Conrad himself treats as identical the cases named and the case
of a heretic. It would, moreover, be over severe to require a man who
has just been converted from heresy to give up his property to the fisc.
FIFTEENTH. It
follows as a corollary that a heretic may lawfully live of his own property.
SIXTEENTH. Secondly,
it follows also that he can make a gratuitous conveyance of his property,
as by way of gift.
SEVENTEENTH.
It follows, thirdly, that if his offense can be brought before the tribunals,
he can not convey his property for value, as by way of sale or dowry.
This is manifest, because he would defraud the buyer, making him incur
the risk of loss of both the thing and the price, should he, the seller,
be condemned.
EIGHTEENTH.
Lastly, it follows that, if there were in fact no risk of confiscation,
he might even make a conveyance for value. Thus, if some heretic were
in Germany, a Catholic could lawfully buy from him. For it would be oppressive
if a Catholic could not buy land from a heretic or sell land to him in
a Lutheran state; yet it would be necessary to say this, if a heretic
were utterly disabled from ownership in the forum of conscience.
NINETEENTH.
From all this the conclusion follows that the barbarians in question can
not be barred from being true owners, alike in public and in private law,
by reason of the sin of unbelief or any other mortal sin, nor does such
sin entitle Christians to seize their goods and lands, as Cajetan proves
at some length and neatly (Secunda Secundae, qu. 66, art. 8).
TWENTIETH. It
remains to ask whether the Indians lacked ownership because of want of
reason or unsoundness of mind. This raises the question whether the use
of reason is a precondition of capacity for ownership in general. Conrad,
indeed (bk. I, qu. 6), propounds the conclusion that ownership is competent
to irrational creatures, alike sensible and insensible. The proof consists
in the fact that ownership is nothing more than the right to put a thing
to one's own use. But brutes have this right over the herbs and plants
(Genesis, ch. 1): "Behold I have given you every herb bearing
seed which is upon the face of all the earth and every tree in the which
is the fruit of a tree yielding seed; to you it shall be for meat and
to every beast of the earth." The stars, too, have the right to shine
for light (Genesis, ch. 1), "And God set them in the firmament
of the heaven to give light upon the earth and to rule over the day and
over the night." And the lion has dominion over all animals that
walk, whence he is called the king of beasts. And the eagle is lord among
the birds whence in Psalm 103 the verse about his house being their leader.[2]
Sylvester (under the word dominium, at the beginning) is of the
same opinion as Conrad, saying that the "elements exercise dominion
one over the other."
I answer by
the following propositions:
First: Irrational
creatures can not have dominion. This is clear, because dominion is a
right, as even Conrad admits. But irrational creatures can not have a
right. Therefore they can not have dominion. The proof of the minor is
that they can not suffer a wrong and therefore can have no right. The
proof of this assumption is that he who kept off a wolf or a lion from
its prey or an ox from its pasture would not do it a wrong, nor would
he who shut a window to prevent the sun from shining in do the sun a wrong.
And this is confirmed by the fact that, if the brutes have dominion, he
who took away the grass from a stag would commit theft, for he would be
taking what belongs to another against the owner's will.
Also, wild beasts
have not dominion over themselves. Therefore much less over other things.
The proof of the assumption is that they may be killed with impunity,
even for pleasure; and so Aristotle (Politics, 1) says that the
chase of wild beasts is just and natural.
Also, wild beasts
themselves and all irrational animals are more fully within the ownership
of man than slaves are. Therefore, if slaves can not have anything of
their own, much less can irrational animals.
Our proposition
is also confirmed by the authority of St. Thomas Aquinas (Prima Secundae,
qu. 1, art. 1 and 2, and qu. 6, art. 2, and Contra Gentiles, bk.
3, c. 110), to the effect that only rational creatures have dominion over
their acts, the test of a roan's being master of his acts being (as St.
Thomas says, Prima Pars, qu. 82, art. 1, on obj. 3) that he has
the power of choice. Hence (as he says in the same place) we are not masters
of our appetite as regards its final end. If, then, the brutes have not
dominion over their acts, they have it not over other things. And although
this seems to be a dispute about a name, it is assuredly a highly improper
and unusual mode of speech to attribute dominion to things irrational.
For we do not ordinarily say that a man has dominion save over that which
is placed within his control. For when we have not dominion, we speak
thus: "It is not within my control," "It is not in my power."
Now, as the brutes are rather moved than move themselves, as St. Thomas
says (Prima Secundae, as above), they for that reason have no dominion.
Nor is there
any force in Sylvester's remark that dominion sometimes does not signify
right, but only power, in which sense we say that fire has dominion over
water. For, if this is enough to confer dominion, a robber has dominion
over his victim even up to death, because he has power to kill him, and
a thief has power to seize his victim's money. Further, as regards the
statement that the stars exercise dominion and that the lion is king of
beasts, obviously this is said metaphorically and by way of figure.
TWENTY-FIRST.
There might seem some doubt whether a boy, who has not yet the use of
reason, can have dominion, inasmuch as he seems to differ little from
irrational animals. And the Apostle says (Galatians, ch. 4): "The
heir, as long as he is a child, differeth nothing from a slave";
but a slave has not dominion; therefore, etc. But let our second proposition
be: Boys, even before they have the use of reason, can have dominion.
This is manifest, because they can suffer wrong; therefore they have rights
over things; therefore also they have dominion, which is naught else than
a right. Also, the property of wards is not part of the guardian's property;
but it has owners and no others are its owners; therefore the wards are
the owners. Also, boys can be heirs; but an heir is one who succeeds to
the rights of the deceased and who has dominion over the inheritance (Dig.,
44, 3, 11, and Inst., 2, 19, 7). Also, as already said, the basis
of dominion is in the possession of the image of God, and children already
possess that image. The Apostle, moreover, says in the passage of Galatians
just cited, "The heir, as long as he is a child, differeth nothing
from a slave, though he be lord of all." The same does not hold good
of an irrational creature, for a boy does not exist for the sake of another,
as does a brute, but for his own sake.
TWENTY-SECOND.
But what about those suffering from unsoundness of mind? I mean a perpetual
unsoundness whereby they neither have nor is there any hope that they
will have the use of reason. Let our third proposition be: It seems that
they can still have dominion, because they can suffer wrong; therefore
they have a right, but whether they can have civil dominion is a question
which I leave to the jurists.
TWENTY-THIRD.
However this may be, let our fourth proposition be:
The Indian aborigines
are not barred on this ground from the exercise of true dominion. This
is proved from the fact that the true state of the case is that they are
not of unsound mind, but have, according to their kind, the use of reason.
This is clear, because there is a certain method in their affairs, for
they have polities which are orderly arranged and they have definite marriage
and magistrates, overlords, laws, and workshops, and a system of exchange,
all of which call for the use of reason; they also have a kind of religion.
Further, they make no error in matters which are self-evident to others;
this is witness to their use of reason. Also, God and nature are not wanting
in the supply of what is necessary in great measure for the race. Now,
the most conspicuous feature of man is reason, and power is useless which
is not reducible to action. Also, it is through no fault of theirs that
these aborigines have for many centuries been outside the pale of salvation,
in that they have been born in sin and void of baptism and the use of
reason whereby to seek out the things needful for salvation. Accordingly
I for the most part attribute their seeming so unintelligent and stupid
to a bad and barbarous upbringing, for even among ourselves we find many
peasants who differ little from brutes.
TWENTY-FOURTH.
The upshot of all the preceding is, then, that the aborigines undoubtedly
had true dominion in both public and private matters, just like Christians,
and that neither their princes nor private persons could be despoiled
of their property on the ground of their not being true owners. It would
be harsh to deny to those, who have never done any wrong, what we grant
to Saracens and Jews, who are the persistent enemies of Christianity.
We do not deny that these latter peoples are true owners of their property,
if they have not seized lands elsewhere belonging to Christians.
It remains to
reply to the argument of the opposite side to the effect that the aborigines
in question seem to be slaves by nature because of their incapability
of self-government. My answer to this is that Aristotle certainly did
not mean to say that such as are not over-strong mentally are by nature
subject to another's power and incapable of dominion alike over themselves
and other things; for this is civil and legal slavery, wherein none are
slaves by nature. Nor does the Philosopher mean that, if any by nature
are of weak mind, it is permissible to seize their patrimony and enslave
them and put them up for sale; but what he means is that by defect of
their nature they need to be ruled and governed by others and that it
is good for them to be subject to others, just as sons need to be subject
to their parents until of full age, and a wife to her husband. And that
this is the Philosopher's intent is clear from his corresponding remark
that some are by nature masters, those, namely, who are of strong intelligence.
Now, it is clear that he does not mean hereby that such persons can arrogate
to themselves a sway over others in virtue of their superior wisdom, but
that nature has given them capacity for rule and government. Accordingly,
even if we admit that the aborigines in question are as inept and stupid
as is alleged, still dominion can not be denied to them, nor are they
to be classed with the slaves of civil law. True, some right to reduce
them to subjection can be based on this reason and title, as we shall
show below. Meanwhile the conclusion stands sure, that the aborigines
in question were true owners, before the Spaniards came among them, both
from the public and the private point of view.
SUMMARY OF THE
SECOND SECTION.
On the illegitimate
titles for the reduction of the aborigines of the New World into the power
of the Spaniards.
1. The Emperor
is not the lord of the whole world.
2. Even if the
Emperor were the lord of the world, that would not entitle him to seize
the provinces of the Indian aborigines and to erect new lords and put
down the former lords or to levy taxes.
3. The Pope
is not civil or temporal lord of the whole world, in the proper sense
of civil lordship and power.
4. Even if the
Supreme Pontiff had secular power over the world, he could not give that
power to secular princes.
5. The Pope
has temporal power, but only so far as it subserves things spiritual.
6. The Pope
has no temporal power over the Indian aborigines or over other unbelievers.
7. A refusal
by these aborigines to recognize any dominion of the Pope is no reason
for making war on them and for seizing their goods.
8. Whether these
aborigines were guilty of the sin of unbelief, in that they did not believe
in Christ, before they heard anything of Christianity.
9. What is required
in order that ignorance may be imputed to a person as, and be, sin, that
is, vincible ignorance. And what about invincible ignorance?
10. Whether
the aborigines are bound to hearken to the first messengers of Christianity
so as to commit mortal sin in not believing Christ's Gospel merely on
its simple announcement to them.
11. If the faith
were simply announced and proposed to them and they will not straightway
receive it, this is no ground for the Spaniards to make war on them or
to proceed against them under the law of war.
12. How the
aborigines, if they refuse when asked and counselled to hear peaceably
preachers of religion, can not be excused from mortal sin.
13. When the
aborigines would be bound to receive Christianity under penalty of mortal
sin.
14. In the author's
view it is not sufficiently dear whether Christianity has been so proposed
and announced to these aborigines that they are bound to believe it under
the penalty of fresh sin.
15. Even when
Christianity has been proposed to them with never so much sufficiency
of proof and they will not accept it, this does not render it lawful to
make war on them and despoil them of their possessions.
16. Christian
princes can not, even on the authority of the Pope, restrain these aborigines
from sins against the law of nature or punish them therefor.
It being premised,
then, that the Indian aborigines are or were true owners, it remains to
inquire by what title the Spaniards could have come into possession of
them and their country.
And first, I
shall advert to the titles which might be alleged, but which are not adequate
or legitimate.
Secondly, I
shall set out the legitimate titles under which the aborigines could have
come under the sway of the Spaniards.
Now, there are
seven titles, which might be alleged, but which are not adequate, and
seven or eight others, which are just and legitimate.
The first title
that might be alleged, then, is that the Emperor is the lord of the world,
and in such a way that, even if it be granted that in time past there
was a defect in his claim, it would by now be purged as regards our present,
most Christian Emperor. For, even if we assume that the Indian aborigines
may be true owners, yet they might have superior lords, just as inferior
princes have a king and as some kings have the Emperor over them. There
can in this way be many persons having dominion over the same thing; and
this accounts for the well-worn distinction drawn by the jurists between
dominion high and low, dominion direct and available, dominion pure and
mixed. The question, therefore, is whether the aborigines had any superior
lord. And, as this question can only arise with regard to either the Emperor
or the Pope, let us speak of these.
The first allegation
to consider is that the Emperor is lord of the whole world and therefore
of these barbarians also. This is supported, firstly, by the appellation,
"Lord of the world," commonly given to the late Emperor Maximilian
or to the present Emperor Charles, ever August. Also (Luke, ch.
2), "There went out a decree from Caesar Augustus that a census should
be taken of all the world"; but Christian Emperors ought not to be
in any worse condition than he; therefore, etc. Also, our Lord seems to
have pronounced Caesar to be the true lord of the Jews. "Render unto
Caesar," said he, "the things that are Caesar's," etc.
(St. Luke, ch. 20). But it does not seem that Caesar could have
this right, save as Emperor. Therefore Bartolus, commenting on the Extravagans
of Henry VII, Ad reprimendum, expressly holds that "the Emperor
is the rightful lord of the whole world." And this is also the opinion
of the glossator on X, 4, 17, 13. So, too, the glossator on X,
1, 6, 34.
And they prove
the allegation first from can. 41, C. 7, qu. 1, where Gregory[3]
says that there is one king among bees, and in the world one Emperor,
and also from Dig., 14, 2, 9, where the Emperor Antoninus says:
I indeed am
lord of the earth," and Cod., 7, 37, 3, § 1, "everything
is understood to belong to the Emperor."
The allegation
might also be supported by the fact that Adam first and then Noah seem
to have been lords of the world: " Let us make man in our image,
after our likeness, and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea
and over the fowl of the air and over all the earth," etc. (Genesis,
ch 1) and a little later on, "Be fruitful and multiply and replenish
the earth and subdue it, etc.; and there is a similar pronouncement made
to Noah (Genesis, ch. 8). But these two had successors. Therefore.
Also, there
is a proof in the incredibility of God's having instituted in the world
anything but the best system of government: "In wisdom hast thou
made them all" (Psalm 104). But monarchy is the best system,
as St. Thomas admirably shows (De regimine principum, bk. 1, ch.
2), and as Aristotle seems to hold (Politics, bk. 3). Therefore,
it seems to be in accordance with divine institution that there should
be one Emperor in the world.
Also, the things
which are outside nature ought to imitate things natural. But in things
natural there is always one governor; as in the body, it is the heart;
in the soul, it is reason. Therefore in the world there ought to be one
governor, just as there is one God.
1. Now, this
contention is baseless. Let our first conclusion, then, be:
The Emperor
is not the lord of the whole earth. This is proved from the fact that
dominion must be founded either on natural or divine or human law; but
there is no lord of the earth in any of these; therefore, etc. The minor
is proved, first as regards natural law, by what St. Thomas well says
(Prima Pars, qu. 92, art. 1, on obj. 2, and qu. 96, art. 4), namely,
that by natural law mankind is free save from paternal and marital dominion
-- for the father has dominion over his children and the husband over
the wife by natural law; therefore no one by natural law has dominion
over the world. And, as St. Thomas also says (Secunda Secundae,
qu. 10, art. 10), dominion and preeminence were introduced by human law;
they, therefore, were not by natural law. Nor would there be any greater
reason why this dominion should be more proper for Germans than for Gauls.
And Aristotle (Politics, bk. 1) says, Power is of two kinds, the
one originates in the family, like that of the father over his sons and
that of the husband over the wife, and this is a natural power; the other
is civil, for, although it may take its rise in nature and so may be said
to be of natural law, as St. Thomas says (De regimine principum,
bk. 1, ch. 2), yet, man being a political animal, it is founded not on
nature, but on law.
Now, as regards
divine law, we do not read that before the coming of our Saviour Christ
the Emperors were lords of the whole world, although in the gloss mentioned
on the Extravagans, Ad reprimendum, Bartolus adduces the passage
in Daniel, ch. 2, about Nebuchadnezzar, of whom it is said: "Thou,
O King, art a King of Kings; for the God of Heaven hath given thee a Kingdom
and power and strength and glory. And wheresoever the children of men
dwell, He hath given thee all." It is, however, certain that Nebuchadnezzar
received his sovereignty from God by no special grant, but in the same
way as other princes (Romans, ch. 13):
"There
is no power but of God"; and (Proverbs, ch. 8): "By me
kings reign and princes decree justice." Further, Nebuchadnezzar
had not a legal rule over the whole earth, as Bartolus thinks, for the
Jews were not legal subjects of his.
Another proof
that there was by divine law no ruler over the whole world lies in the
fact that the Jewish nation was free from the foreigner; nay, the Jews
were forbidden by their law to have any foreigner as their lord (Deuteronomy,
ch. 17): "Thou mayest not set a stranger to be king over thee."
And, although St. Thomas (De regimine principum, bk. 3, ch. 4 and
5) says that the Romans were entrusted with empire by God because of their
justice and their patriotism and the excellence of their laws, yet this
is not to be taken to mean that they had their empire by divine grant
or institution, as St. Augustine also says (De civitate Dei, ch.
18), but that in the divine providence it befell that they should obtain
the sovereignty of the world. This, however, was not in the way in which
Saul or David had his kingdom from God, but in some other way, such as
by just war or other title.
This will be
plain to any one who considers the titles and modes of succession whereby
sovereignty and lordship in the world have come down to our own day. For,
to omit everything that happened before the flood, the world was certainly
divided after Noah into different provinces and kingdoms, whether this
were by ordinance of Noah himself -- for he survived the flood three hundred
and fifty years (Genesis, ch. 9), and sent colonies into different
regions, as appears in Berosus of Babylon -- or whether, as is more likely,
different family-groups by the common agreement of mankind occupied different
provinces, as (Genesis, ch. 13) "Abram said unto Lot: ‘...
Is not the whole land before thee? ... If thou wilt take the left hand,
then I will go to the right, or if thou depart to the right hand, then
I will go to the left." We are, accordingly, told (Genesis,
ch. 10) that through the descendants of Noah came diversities of peoples
and countries, whether in some regions they first assumed lordship by
usurpation, as Nimrod seems to have done, of whom Genesis, ch.
10, v. 8, says that he was the first to be a mighty one in the earth,
or whether by accord of several to unite in one State they appointed a
prince over themselves by common agreement. For it is sure that either
in these or in other like modes sovereignty and lordship began in the
world and that afterwards, either by right of inheritance or of war or
by some other such title, they were continued unto our own day, or at
any rate up to the time of the Saviour's coming. Herein it is manifest
that before the coming of Christ no one was vested with world-wide sway
by divine law and that the Emperor can not at the present day derive therefrom
a title to arrogate to himself lordship over the whole earth, and consequently
not over the barbarians.
It might, however,
be alleged that after our Lord's coming there was one Emperor over the
world by express grant of Christ, in that He, as regards His manhood,
was Lord of the world, according to St. Matthew, ch. 28: "All
power is given unto me," etc., which, according to St. Augustine
and St. Jerome, is to be understood as regards His manhood. Also, as the
Apostle declares (I Corinthians, ch. 15), "He hath put all
things under his feet." Therefore, just as He left on earth one vicar
in matters spiritual, so also in matters temporal, and in the latter case
it is the Emperor. St. Thomas, too, says (De regimine principum,
bk. 3, ch. 13) that Christ was from His nativity the true Lord and monarch
of the world and that Augustus though unwitting thereof, was acting as
His deputy. Now, it is clear that this deputyship was not in matters spiritual,
but in matters temporal. Seeing, then, that Christ's Kingdom, if it were
temporal, was over the whole world, Augustus was, on that showing, lord
of the world and so on the same principle his successors were.
This reasoning
is, however, quite inadmissible: In the first place, because of the doubt
attaching to the statement that Christ as regards His manhood was temporal
Lord of the world. The probability indeed is that He was not, and our
Lord seems to have asserted as much in the passage: "My Kingdom is
not of this world."[4]
Accordingly. St. Thomas remarks in this connection that Christ's dominion
is directly appointed for the soul's salvation and for spiritual profit,
although it is not excluded in matters temporal in the same fashion as
it is appointed in matters spiritual. This shows that in St. Thomas's
view His Kingdom was not of the same sort as a civil and temporal kingdom,
but that, while He had all kinds of power, even in matters temporal, which
would subserve the aim of redemption, yet apart from that aim He had none.
Further, even if we grant that He was temporal Lord, it is guess-work
to say that He bequeathed that power to the Emperor, there being no mention
of any such thing in the whole Bible. And as regards St. Thomas's statement
that the Emperor Augustus was Christ's vicegerent, firstly, he does indeed
make it in the passage referred to, but in his Tertia Pars, where
he is professedly discussing the power of Christ, he makes no mention
of this temporal power.
Secondly, St.
Thomas's meaning is that the Emperor was Christ's vicegerent to the extent
that temporal power is subordinate and subservient to spiritual power.
In this sense, of a truth, kings are the servants of bishops, just as
the smith's art is subject to the knight's and the soldier's, while all
the time neither the soldier nor his superior officer is a smith, but
is only concerned to give the smith orders about the making of armor.
Again, St. Thomas, writing on that passage in St. John, ch. 18,
expressly says that Christ's Kingdom is not temporal or such a kingdom
as Pilate conceived, but a spiritual kingdom, inasmuch as our Lord declares
in that passage: "Thou sayest that I am a King. To this end was I
born and for this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness
unto the truth." This shows it to be a mere fiction to say that by
express grant of Christ there is one Emperor and lord of the world.
A consideration
which palpably confirms this is the following: If there had been any such
institution by divine law, how comes it that the Empire was divided into
Eastern and Western, first among the sons of Constantine the Great and
then, later, by Pope Stephen, who conferred the Empire of the West on
the Germans, as is held in X, 1, 6, 34? For the assertion that
the Greeks thereafter were not Emperors is inept and ignorant, as the
glossator hereon points out, seeing that the German Emperors never claimed
in virtue of this grant to be Lords of Greece, and John Palaeologus, Emperor
of Constantinople, was held to be lawful Emperor at the Council of Florence.
Moreover, the patrimony of the Church (as the jurists themselves, and
even Bartolus, confess) is not subject to the Emperor. Now, if all things
were subject to the Emperor by divine law, no imperial gift or any other
title could divest the Emperors of them, any more than the Pope can release
any one from the power of the Popes. Also, the Kingdom of Spain is not
subject to the Emperor, nor is France, as is also held in X, 1,
6, 34 abovementioned, although the glossator adds out of his own head
that this is not so much a matter of law as of fact. Also, the doctors
agree that States, which have in times past been subject to the Empire,
might be freed from that subjection by prescription; which would not be
the case, if this subjection were in virtue of a divine law.
Now, in point
of human law, it is manifest that the Emperor is not lord of the world,
because either this would be by the sole authority of some law, and there
is none such; or, if there were, it would be void of effect, inasmuch
as law presupposes jurisdiction. If, then, the Emperor had no jurisdiction
over the world before the law, the law could not bind one who was not
previously subject to it. Nor, on the other hand, had the Emperor this
position by lawful succession or by gift or by exchange or by purchase
or by just war or by election or by any other legal title, as is admitted.
Therefore the Emperor never was the lord of the whole world.
2. Second conclusion:
Granted that the Emperor were the lord of the world, still that would
not entitle him to seize the provinces of the Indian aborigines and erect
new lords there and put down the former ones or take taxes. The proof
is herein, namely, that even those who attribute lordship over the world
to the Emperor do not claim that he is lord in ownership, but only in
jurisdiction, and this latter right does not go so far as to warrant him
in converting provinces to his own use or in giving towns or even estates
away at his pleasure. This, then, shows that the Spaniards can not justify
on this ground their seizure of the provinces in question.
A second alleged
title to the lawful possession of these lands, and one which is vehemently
asserted, is traced through the Supreme Pontiff. For it is claimed that
the Pope is temporal monarch, too, over all the world and that he could
consequently make the Kings of Spain sovereign over the aborigines in
question, and that so it has been done.
In this matter
there are some jurists, who hold that the Pope has full jurisdiction in
temporal matters over the whole earth, and they even add that the power
of all secular princes comes to them from the Pope. This is the tenet
of Hostiensis on X, 3, 34, 8; also of the Archbishop (pt. 3, tit.
22, ch. 5, § 8); and also of Augustinus Anconitanus. Sylvester holds the
same doctrine, making a much more ample and liberal concession of this
power to the Pope, under the word infidelitas (§ 7) and under the
word Papa (§§ 7, 10, 11 and 14), and under the word legitimus
(§ 4). He has some singular remarks on this topic in the passages mentioned,
as, for example, that "the power of the Emperor and all other princes
is sub-delegated as regards the Pope, being derived from God through the
medium of the Pope," and that "all their power is dependent
on the Pope," and that "Constantine gave lands to the Pope in
recognition of his temporal power," and on the other hand that "the
Pope gave the Empire to Constantine to his use and profit," nay,
that "Constantine's act was really not a gift, but merely the return
of what had previously been taken away," and that, "if the Pope
does not exercise jurisdiction in temporal matters outside the patrimony
of the Church, this is not for want of authority, but in order to avoid
the scandal of the Jews and in order to promote peace"; and many
other things even more empty and absurd than these. The sole proof that
he gives herefor is in the passages "The earth is the Lord's and
the fulness thereof,"[5]
and "All power is given unto me, both in heaven and in earth,"[6]
and the Pope is the vicar of God and of Christ, and (Philippians,
ch. 2) Christ "for our sake became obedient even unto death,"
etc. Bartolus, too, seems to be of this opinion in his comment on the
Extravagans, Ad reprimendum, and St. Thomas seems to favor it at
the end of the second book of the Sententiae, the closing words
of which are by way of solution of the fourth argument, which is the last
of the whole book, namely, that the Pope holds the summit of both kinds
of power, both secular and spiritual, and Herveus is of the same opinion
in his De potestate Ecclesiae.
This, then,
being laid as a basis, the authors of this opinion say as follows: In
the first place, that the Pope has free power, on the footing of supreme
temporal lord, to make the Kings of Spain rulers over the Indian aborigines.
Secondly, they say that, even if it be assumed that he could not do this,
at any rate if these aborigines refused to recognize the temporal power
of the Pope over them, this would warrant him in making war on them and
in putting rulers over them. Now, each of these things has been done.
For, first, the Supreme Pontiff granted the provinces in question to the
Kings of Spain. Secondly, the aborigines were notified that the Pope is
the vicar of God and His vicegerent on earth and it was claimed that they
should, therefore, recognize him as their superior, and their refusal
furnishes a good ground for making war on them and seizing their lands,
etc. Hostiensis, place cited, expressly makes this point, so does
Angelus in his Summa.
Now, inasmuch
as I have fully discussed the temporal power of the Pope in my Relectio
de Potestate Ecclesiastica, I will put my answer to the above into
a few brief propositions:
3. First: The
Pope is not civil or temporal lord of the whole world in the proper sense
of the words "lordship" and "civil power." This is
the conclusion arrived at by Torquemada (bk. 2, ch. 113), and by Joannes
Andreae and by Hugo, on can. 6, Disc. 96. And the most learned Innocent
admits, in the above cited X, 1, 6, 34, that he has not temporal
power over the Kingdom of France. And it seems the definite opinion of
St. Bernard in the second book of his De consideratione, addressed
to Pope Eugenius III. The opposite opinion seems contrary to the precept
of our Lord who, (St. Matthew, ch. 20, and St. Luke, ch,
22), says, "Ye know that the princes of the Gentiles exercise lordship
over them," etc. "But it shall not be so among you." And
contrary also to the precept of the Apostle Peter, "neither as being
lords over [God's] heritage but being ensamples to the flock,"[7]
And if Christ the Lord had not temporal power, as has been shown in the
foregoing discussion to be more probable and as is also the opinion of
St. Thomas, much less has the Pope it, he being Christ's vicar. The above-mentioned
thinkers attribute to the Pope that which he has never claimed for himself;
nay, he admits the contrary in many passages, as I have shown in the Relectio
referred to. And the proof is sufficient, like that given above concerning
the Emperor, for no lordship can come to him save either by natural law
or by divine law or by human law. Now, it is certain that none comes to
him by natural or by human law, and none is shown to come to him by divine
law. Therefore the assertion is ungrounded and arbitrary.
Further, our
Lord's injunction to Peter, "Feed my sheep,"[8]
clearly shows that power in spiritual and not in temporal matters is meant.
It is, moreover, demonstrable that the Pope has not the whole world for
his sphere. For our Lord said (St. John, ch. 10) that there should
be "one flock and one shepherd" at the end of the age. This
is sufficient proof that at the present day all are not sheep of this
flock. Again, assuming that Christ had this power, it is manifest that
it has not been entrusted to the Pope. This appears from the fact that
the Pope is no less vicar of Christ in spiritual than in temporal matters.
But the Pope has no spiritual jurisdiction over unbelievers, as even our
opponents admit, and, as seems (I Corinthians, ch. 5) to have been
the express teaching of the Apostle: "For what have I to do to judge
them also that are without?" Therefore he has it not also in temporal
matters. And of a truth there is nothing in the argument that, as Christ
had temporal power over the world, therefore the Pope also has it. For
Christ undoubtedly had spiritual power over the whole world, not less
over believers than over unbelievers and could make laws which bound the
whole world, as he did with regard to baptism and the articles of faith.
And yet the Pope has not that power over unbelievers and may not excommunicate
them or forbid their marriage within the degrees permitted by the divine
law. Therefore. Also, the fact that, according to the doctors, Christ
did not entrust supremacy in power even to the Apostles shows that there
is no force in the consequence: Christ had temporal power over the world;
therefore the Pope has it too.
4. Second proposition:
Even assuming that the Supreme Pontiff had this secular power over the
whole world, he could not give it to secular princes. This is obvious,
because it would be annexed to the Papacy. Nor can any Pope sever it from
the office of Supreme Pontiff or deprive his successor of that power,
for the succeeding Supreme Pontiff can not be less than his predecessor;
and, if some one Pontiff had made a gift of this power, either the grant
would be null or the succeeding Pontiff could cancel it.
5. Third proposition:
The Pope has temporal power only so far as it is in subservience to matters
spiritual, that is, as far as is necessary for the administration of spiritual
affairs. This is also the view of Torquemada (as above, ch. 114),
and of all the doctors. And the proof of it lies in the tact that an art
to which a higher end pertains is imperative and preceptive as regards
the arts to which lower ends pertain (Ethics, bk. 1). But the end
of spiritual power is ultimate felicity, while the end of civil power
is political felicity. Therefore, temporal power is subject to spiritual
power This is the reasoning adopted by Innocent in X, 1, 33, 6;
and it receives confirmation from the consideration that, whenever anybody
is entrusted with the charge of any office, he is impliedly granted everything
without which the duties of the office can not rightly be discharged (X,
1, 29, 1)
Inasmuch, then.
as the Pope is a spiritual pastor by Christ's commission and the discharge
of the duties of this office can not be hindered by the civil power (there
being no lack in the provision of things necessary either by God or by
Nature), it is beyond doubt that power over things temporal has also been
left to him so far as is necessary for the government of things spiritual.
And on this principle the Pope can infringe civil laws which tend to breed
sinners, just as he has infringed the laws with regard to prescription
by a party acting in bad faith, as is clear from X, 2, 26, 20.
And on this principle also, when princes are at variance with one another
about some right of sovereignty and are rushing into war, he can act as
judge and inquire into the claims of the parties and deliver judgment,
a judgment which the princes are bound to respect, lest those numerous
spiritual evils should befall which are the inevitable results of a war
between Christian princes. And although the Pope does not do this or does
not do it often, it is not because he can not, as Master Durandus says,
but because, for fear of scandal, he wishes to prevent the princes from
thinking his motive is ambition or because he is afraid of a revolt from
the Apostolic See on the part of the princes. And on this principle the
Pope can sometimes depose kings and even set up new kings, as at times
has been done. And certainly no one rightly calling himself Christian
should deny this power to the Pope. This is the view held by Paludanus
and Durandus (De jurisdictione ecclesiastica), and by Henricus
Gandavensis (Quodlibeta, 6, art. 23). It is in this sense, also,
that those numerous rules are to be interpreted which say that the Pope
has both swords. The earlier doctors make the same assertion, as also
does St. Thomas in the second book of the Sententiae, as above
quoted.
Aye, and there
is no doubt that in this way bishops have temporal authority within their
bishoprics on the same principle that the Pope has authority in the world.
And so they err in speech and in deed, whether princes or magistrates,
who strive to prevent bishops from deterring laymen from sin by fines
or exile or other temporal punishments. For this is not in excess of their
power, provided they do not do it from greed or for gain, but of necessity
and for profit in things spiritual. And herein we find a further argument
in support of our first conclusion; for if the Pope were lord of the world,
a bishop would also be temporal lord in his bishopric, seeing that within
his bishopric he also is a vicar of Christ, but this our opponents deny.
6. Fourth conclusion:
The Pope has no temporal power over the Indian aborigines or over other
unbelievers. This is dear from propositions I and III. For he has no temporal
power save such as subserves spiritual matters. But he has no spiritual
power over them (I Corinth., ch. 5, v. 12). Therefore he has no
temporal power either.
7. The corollary
follows that even if the barbarians refuse to recognize any lordship of
the Pope, that furnishes no ground for making war on them and seizing
their property. This is dear, because he has no such lordship. And it
receives manifest confirmation from the fact (as will be asserted below
and as our opponents admit) that, even if the barbarians refuse to accept
Christ as their lord, this does not justify making war on them or doing
them any hurt. Now, it is utterly absurd for our opponents to say that,
while the barbarians go scatheless for rejecting Christ, they should be
bound to accept His vicar under penalty of war and confiscation of their
property, aye, and penal chastisement. And a second confirmation is furnished
by the fact that the ground, according to the persons in question, for
disallowing compulsion, even if they refuse to accept Christ or His faith,
is that it can not be evidently proved to them by natural reasoning. But
the lordship of the Pope admits of this proof still less. Therefore they
can not be compelled to recognize this lordship.
Again, although
Sylvester discourses at great length on the power of the Pope, yet, under
the word infideles (§ 7), he expressly maintains against Hostiensis
that unbelievers can not be compelled by arms to recognize this lordship
and can not be deprived of their property on this pretext. And Innocent
maintains the same in X, 3, 34, 8. There is also no doubt that
this was the opinion of St. Thomas too (Secunda Secundae, qu. 66,
art. 8, on obj. 2); Cajetan is express thereon, in his comment on the
passage where St. Thomas says that unbelievers cannot be deprived of their
property, save only that the subjects of temporal princes can be deprived
for reasons known to the law and rendering their subjects in general liable
to deprivation. Of a truth, Saracens dwelling among Christians have never
been deprived of their property on any such pretext or made to suffer
any harm. Why, if this pretext be enough to justify making war on them,
it is as much as to say that they can be deprived by reason of their unbelief.
For it is certain that none of the unbelievers recognize this lordship.
But there is no doctor even among our opponents who would allow that they
can be deprived on the mere ground of unbelief. Therefore the allegation
of the doctors in question is utterly sophistical, namely, that if the
unbelievers recognize the lordship of the Roman Pontiff, war can not be
made on them, but that it may if they do not recognize it; for none of
them does recognize it.
This shows that
the title under discussion can not be set up against the barbarians and
that Christians have no just cause of war against them either on the ground
that the Pope has made a gift of their lands on the footing of absolute
lord or that they do not recognize the lordship of the Pope. This is the
opinion maintained by Cajetan at considerable length, on Secunda Secundae,
qu. 66, art. 8, on obj. 2. And the authority of the canonists to the contrary
ought not to weigh much, because, as said above, these matters are to
be discussed with reference to the divine law, and the majority in numbers
and weight hold the contrary view, and among the latter is Joannes Andreae.
Our opponents have no text in their favor. And even the weighty authority
of the Archbishop of Florence is not to be admitted here, for he followed
Augustinus Anconitanus, just as in other places he usually follows the
canonists. What has been said demonstrates, then that at the time of the
Spaniards' first voyages to America they took with them no right to occupy
the lands of the indigenous population.
Accordingly,
there is another title which can be set up, namely, by right of discovery;
and no other title was originally set up, and it was in virtue of this
title alone that Columbus the Genoan first set sail. And this seems to
be an adequate title because those regions which are deserted become,
by the law of nations and the natural law, the property of the first occupant
(Inst., 2, 1, 12). Therefore, as the Spaniards were the first to
discover and occupy the provinces in question, they are in lawful possession
thereof, just as if they had discovered some lonely and thitherto uninhabited
region.
Not much, however,
need be said about this third title of ours, because, as proved above,
the barbarians were true owners, both from the public and from the private
standpoint. Now the rule of the law of nations is that what belongs to
nobody is granted to the first occupant, as is expressly laid down in
the aforementioned passage of the Institutes. And so, as the object
in question was not without an owner, it does not fall under the title
which we are discussing. Although, then, this title, when conjoined with
another, can produce some effect here (as will be said below), yet in
and by itself it gives no support to a seizure of the aborigines any more
than if it had been they who had discovered us.
Accordingly,
a fourth title is set up, namely, that they refuse to accept the faith
of Christ, although it is set before them and although they have been
adjured and advised to accept it. This title might seem to be a lawful
one for occupying the lands of the barbarians, firstly, on the ground
that the obligation of the aborigines to receive the faith of Christ results
from the passage: "Whoso believeth and is baptized shall be saved,
but he who believeth not shall be damned."[9]
But damnation is not visited on any one except for a mortal sin, and "There
is no other name given among men whereby we must be saved" (Acts,
ch. 4). Therefore, as the Pope is the minister of Christ, at least in
things spiritual, it would appear that at any rate by the authority of
the Pope they can be compelled to receive the faith of Christ, and if
they reject the demand to receive it they may be proceeded against under
the law of war. Nay, it would seem that princes may do this on their own
authority also, seeing that they are God's ministers (Romans, ch.
13), and "revengers [to execute] wrath upon them that do evil."
But those, indeed, do evil who do not accept the faith of Christ. Therefore
they can be coerced by princes.
A second argument
is: If the French refused to obey their King, the King of Spain could
compel them to obedience. Therefore, if the Indian aborigines refuse to
obey God, who is their true and supreme Lord, Christian princes can compel
them to obedience; for the cause of God ought not to be in worse condition
than the cause of men. And this is confirmed, as Scotus (bk. 4, dist.
4, qu. 9) argues about the baptism of the children of unbelievers, by
the fact that persons ought to be compelled to obey a superior lord rather
than an inferior lord. If, then, compulsion may be employed to make these
aborigines obey their chiefs, much more may it be employed to make them
obey Christ and God.
A third argument
is: If the barbarians publicly blasphemed Christ, they could be compelled
by war to cease from such blasphemies, as the doctors admit and as is
true. For we could take measures of war against them, if they made a mock
of the crucifix or in any other way abused Christian practices by way
of insult, as by jesting imitation of the Sacraments of the Church or
the like conduct. This is obvious; for if they outraged a Christian sovereign,
even one now dead, we could avenge the outrage; much more, then, if they
outrage Christ, who is the living King of Christians. This is indubitable;
for if Christ were alive in the flesh and pagans wrought an outrage on
Him, there is no doubt that we could avenge the outrage by war. So, therefore,
in this case. But unbelief is a greater sin than blasphemy, for, as St.
Thomas asserts and proves (Secunda Secundae, qu. 10, art. 3), unbelief
is the gravest of the sins which lie in moral perversity, because it is
directly opposed to faith, while blasphemy is not directly opposed to
faith, but to the confession of faith. Unbelief cuts at the root of turning
to God, that is, at faith, while blasphemy does not. Therefore, seeing
that Christians can proceed by war against unbelievers for their blasphemy
of Christ, so they can for their unbelief itself. And the contention that
blasphemy is not so great a sin as unbelief is confirmed by the fact that
unbelief, is, in a Christian, a capital crime by the civil laws, while
blasphemy is not.
8. By way of
answer let my first proposition be: Before the barbarians heard anything
about Christianity, they did not commit the sin of unbelief by not believing
in Christ. This proposition is precisely that of St. Thomas in Secunda
Secundae, qu. 10, art. 1, where he says that in those who have not
heard of Christ unbelief does not wear the guise of sin, but rather of
punishment, such ignorance of things divine being a consequence of the
sin of our first parent. "Such unbelievers as these," says he,
"are indeed open to condemnation for other sins, ... but not for
the sin of unbelief." Accordingly our Lord says (St. John,
ch. 15): "If I had not come and spoken unto them, they had not had
sin." St. Augustine, in his exposition of this passage, says it refers
to the sin of unbelief in Christ. St. Thomas says the same (Secunda
Secundae, qu. 10, art. 6, and qu. 34, art. 2, on obj. 2).
This proposition
is opposed to the teaching of many doctors and especially to that of Altissiodorensis,
3 p.,[10]
on the question, Utrum fidei possit subesse falsum, where he says
that ignorance not only of Christ, but of any article of faith is not
invincible ignorance in any one, for if a man does what in him lies, God
will illuminate him either through the doctor that is within him or through
a doctor outside, and so it is always a mortal sin to believe anything
contrary to articles of faith. He takes an illustration from an old woman
to whom a bishop might preach something contrary to an article of faith.
And he lays down the general proposition that ignorance of divine law
excuseth none. William of Paris was of the same opinion and supported
it by the same kind of argument. For either, says he, such an one does
what in him lies and therefore will receive illumination, or if he does
not this, he is without excuse. And Gerson (De spirituali vita animae,
lect. 4) appears to be of the same view. "Doctors are unanimous,"
says he, "that in matters of the divine law there is no room for
invincible ignorance, seeing that God will always help him who does what
in him lies, and He is ready to enlighten the mind as far as will be necessary
for salvation and the avoidance of error." And Hugo de Sancto Victore
([11]bk.
2, pt. 6, ch. 5) says that none is excused by ignorance for breach of
the command to receive baptism, for he could have heard and known, had
it not been for his own fault, as was the case with Cornelius (Acts,
ch. 10).
Adrian gives
precision to this doctrine, in his Quodlibeta, qu. 4. "There
is," says he, "a two-fold distinction in matters of the divine
law. There are some matters to the knowledge of which God does not oblige
every one universally, such as the nice problems of the divine law and
difficulties with regard to this law and with regard to Holy Scripture
and the Commandments; in these matters there may well be a case of invincible
ignorance, even if a man does all that in him lies. There are other matters
to the knowledge of which God obliges all men generally, such as the articles
of faith and the universal commandments of the law; of these it is true,
as the doctors assert, that ignorance thereof is not excused. For if any
one does what in him lies, he will be illuminated of God through either
the doctor that is within him or a doctor from without."
Nevertheless,
the conclusion above stated is entirely in accord with St. Thomas's doctrine.
The proof of it is as follows: Such as have never heard anything, however
much they may be sinners in other respects, are under an invincible ignorance;
therefore, their ignorance is not sin. The antecedent is evident from
the passage (Romans, ch. 10): "How shall they believe in him
of whom they have not heard, and how shall they hear without a preacher?"
Therefore, if the faith has not been preached to them, their ignorance
is invincible, for it was impossible for them to know. And what Paul condemns
in unbelievers is not that they have not done what in them lies in order
to receive illumination from God, but that they do not believe after they
have heard. "Have they not heard?" says he, "Yes, verily,
their sound went into all the earth." That is the ground of his condemnation,
inasmuch as the Gospel has been preached over all the earth; he would
not otherwise condemn them, whatever other sins they might have.
This shows that
Adrian was also mistaken in another point, with regard to the subject-matter
of their ignorance; for in the same note he says, with regard to the subject-matter
of morals, that if a man bestows all industry and diligence in getting
to know that which behoves him, this is not enough to procure him an excuse
for his ignorance, unless by repentance of his sins he specially prepares
himself to be illuminated by God. Suppose, then, a man is in doubt about
a certain business arrangement and makes inquiry of learned men and tries
in other ways to find out the truth and thinks that the thing is lawful;
if it really is not lawful and he does it, he is without excuse, if in
another respect he is in sin, because he does not do all that in him lies
to conquer his ignorance, and although it be admitted that were he to
render himself amenable to grace he would not receive illumination, still
he is without excuse so long as he does not remove the hindrance in question,
that is, his sin. Accordingly, if Peter and John are in doubt in the same
case and business matter and bestow equal human diligence, and each thinks
the thing is lawful, but Peter is in grace, while John is in sin, Peter's
ignorance is invincible, but John's is vincible, and if they both embark
on the business, Peter is excused and John is not. Adrian, I say, makes
a mistake here, as I have shown at length in my discussion on Prima
Secundae on the topic of ignorance. For it would be strange to say
that there is no topic of the divine law on which an unbeliever, aye,
any one who is in mortal sin, can be invincibly ignorant. Nay, it would
follow in the case of the above-named Peter, who was in grace and whose
ignorance on some point about usury or simony was invincible, that his
ignorance would become vincible merely by his faffing into mortal sin,
which is absurd.
9. I say accordingly
on this point that negligence with regard to the subject-matter is requisite
for ignorance, even though it be vincible, to be imputed as, and to be,
a sin, as, for example, that the man refused to hear or did not believe
what he did hear; and on the other band I say that for invincible ignorance
it is enough that the man bestowed human diligence in trying to learn,
even if in other respects he is in mortal sin. And so on this point our
judgment is the same concerning one in sin and one in grace, both now
and immediately after Christ's coming or after His passion. Adrian could
not deny that after our Lord's passion the Jews in India or in Spain were
invincibly ignorant of His passion, however much they were in mortal sin;
nay, he himself has expressly conceded this in his first quaestio,
fourth point, on the topic de observantia legalium. And it is certain
that the Jews who were away from Judaea, whether they were in sin or not,
had invincible ignorance about baptism and about the faith of Christ.
Just as there could at that time be a case of invincible ignorance on
this matter, so there may also be nowadays among those who have not had
baptism declared to them. But the mistake which the doctors in question
make is in thinking that when we postulate invincible ignorance on the
subject of baptism or of the Christian faith it follows at once that a
person can be saved without baptism or the Christian faith, which, however,
does not follow. For the aborigines to whom no preaching of the faith
or Christian religion has come will be damned for mortal sins or for idolatry,
but not for the sin of unbelief, as St. Thomas (Secunda Secundae,
as above) says, namely, that if they do what in them lies, accompanied
by a good life according to the law of nature, it is consistent with God's
providence and He will illuminate them regarding the name of Christ, but
it does not therefore follow that if their life be bad, ignorance or unbelief
in baptism and the Christian faith may be imputed to them as a sin.
10. Second proposition:
The Indians in question are not bound, directly the Christian faith is
announced to them, to believe it, in such a way that they commit mortal
sin by not believing it, merely because it has been declared and announced
to them that Christianity is the true religion and that Christ is the
Saviour and Redeemer of the world, without miracle or any other proof
or persuasion. This proposition is proved by the first:
For if before
hearing anything of the Christian religion they were excused, they are
put under no fresh obligation by a simple declaration and announcement
of this kind, for such announcement is no proof or incentive to belief.
Nay, as Cajetan says (on Secunda Secundae, qu. 1, art. 4), it would
be rash and imprudent for any one to believe anything, especially in matters
which concern salvation, unless he knows that this is asserted by a man
worthy of credence, a thing which the aboriginal Indians do not know,
seeing that they do not know who or what manner of men they are who are
announcing the new religion to them. And this is confirmed by what St.
Thomas says (Secunda Secundae, qu. 1, art. 4, on obj. 2, and art.
5, on obj. 1), namely, that matters of faith are seen and become evident
by reason of their credibility. For a believer would not believe unless
he saw that the things were worthy of belief either because of the evidence
of signs or for some other reason of this kind. Therefore, where there
are no such signs nor anything else of persuasive force, the aborigines
are not bound to believe. And this is confirmed by the consideration that
if the Saracens were at the same time to set their creed before them in
the same way and without anything more, like the Christians, they would
not be bound to believe them. as is certain. Therefore they are not bound
to believe the Christians either, when without any moving or persuasive
accompaniments they set the faith before them, for they are unable, and
are not bound, to guess which of the two is the truer religion, unless
a greater weight of probability be apparent on one side. For this would
be to believe hastily, which is a mark of levity of heart, as Ecclesiasticus,
ch. 19, says. Further confirmation is furnished by the passage in St.
John, ch. 15: "If I had not wrought signs," etc., "they
would not have had sin." Therefore, where there are no signs, and
nothing to induce belief, there will be no sin.
11. From this
proposition it follows that, if the faith be presented to the Indians
in the way named only and they do not receive it, the Spaniards can not
make this a reason for waging war on them or for proceeding against them
under the law of war. This is manifest, because they are innocent in this
respect and have done no wrong to the Spaniards. And this corollary receives
confirmation from the fact that, as St. Thomas lays it down (Secunda
Secundae, qu. 40, art. 1), for a just war "there must be a just
cause, namely, they who are attacked for some fault must deserve the attack."
Accordingly, St. Augustine says (Liber 83 Quaestionum): "It
is involved in the definition of a just war that some wrong is being avenged,
as where a people or state is to be punished for neglect to exact amends
from its citizens for their wrongdoing or to restore what has been wrongfully
taken away." Where, then, no wrong has previously been committed
by the Indians, there is no cause of just war. This is the received opinion
of all the doctors, not only of the theologians, but also of the jurists,
such as Hostiensis, Innocent, and others. Cajetan (Secunda Secundae,
qu. 66, art. 8) lays it down clearly and I know of no doctor whose opinion
is to the contrary. Therefore this would not be a legitimate title to
seize the lands of the aborigines or to despoil the former owners.
12. Third proposition:
If the Indians, after being asked and admonished to hear the peaceful
preachers of religion, refused, they would not be excused of mortal sin.
The proof lies in the supposition that they have very grave errors for
which they have no probable or demonstrable reasons. Therefore, if any
one admonishes them to hear and deliberate upon religious matters, they
are bound at least to hear and to enter into consultation. Further, it
is needful for their salvation that they believe in Christ and be baptized
(St. Mark, last ch.), "Whoso believeth," etc. But they
can not believe unless they hear (Romans, ch. 10). Therefore they
are bound to hear, otherwise if they are not bound to hear, they would,
without their own fault, be outside the pale of salvation.
13. Fourth proposition:
If the Christian faith be put before the aborigines with demonstration,
that is, with demonstrable and reasonable arguments, and this be accompanied
by an upright life, well-ordered according to the law of nature (an argument
which weighs much in confirmation of the truth), and this be done not
once only and perfunctorily, but diligently and zealously, the aborigines
are bound to receive the faith of Christ under penalty of mortal sin.
This is proved by our third proposition, for, if they are bound to hear,
they are in consequence bound also to acquiesce in what they hear, if
it be reasonable. This is abundantly clear from the passage (St. Mark,
last ch.): "Go ye out into all the world, preach the Gospel to every
creature; whoso believeth and is baptized shall be saved, but whoso believeth
not shall be damned"; and by the passage (Acts, ch. 4): "No
other name is given unto man whereby we can be saved."
14. Fifth proposition:
It is not sufficiently clear to me that the Christian faith has yet been
so put before the aborigines and announced to them that they are bound
to believe it or commit fresh sin. I say this because (as appears from
my second proposition) they are not bound to believe unless the faith
be put before them with persuasive demonstration. Now, I hear of no miracles
or signs or religious patterns of life; nay, on the the other hand, I
hear of many scandals and cruel crimes and acts of impiety. Hence it does
not appear that the Christian religion has been preached to them with
such sufficient propriety and piety that they are bound to acquiesce in
it, although many religious and other ecclesiastics seem both by their
lives and example and their diligent preaching to have bestowed sufficient
pains and industry in this business, had they not been hindered therein
by others who had other matters in their charge.
15. Sixth proposition:
Although the Christian faith may have been announced to the Indians with
adequate demonstration and they have refused to receive it, yet this is
not a reason which justifies making war on them and depriving them of
their property. This conclusion is definitely stated by St. Thomas (Secunda
Secundae, qu. 10, art. 8), where he says that unbelievers who have
never received the faith, like Gentiles and Jews, are in no wise to be
compelled to do so. This is the received conclusion of the doctors alike
in the canon law and the civil law. The proof lies in the fact that belief
is an operation of the will. Now, fear detracts greatly from the voluntary
(Ethics, bk. 3), and it is a sacrilege to approach under the influence
of servile fear as far as the mysteries and sacraments of Christ. Our
conclusion is also proved by the canon de Judaeis (can. 5, Dist.
45), which says: "The holy synod also enjoins concerning the Jews
that thenceforth force be not applied to any of them to make him believe;
‘for God has compassion on whom He wills, and whom He wills He hardens.'"[12]
There is no doubt about the doctrine of the Council of Toledo, that threats
and fears should not be employed against the Jews in order to make them
receive the faith. And Gregory expressly says the same in the canon qui
sincera (can. 3, Dist. 45): "Who with sincerity of purpose,"
says he, "desires to bring into the perfect faith those who are outside
the Christian religion should labor in a manner that will attract and
not with severity; ... for whosoever does otherwise and under cover of
the latter would turn them from their accustomed worship and ritual is
demonstrably furthering his own end thereby and not God's end."
Our proposition
receives further proof from the use and custom of the Church. For never
have Christian Emperors, who had as advisors the most holy and wise Pontiffs,
made war on unbelievers for their refusal to accept the Christian religion.
Further, war is no argument for the truth of the Christian faith. Therefore
the Indians can not be induced by war to believe, but rather to feign
belief and reception of the Christian faith, which is monstrous and a
sacrilege. And although Scotus (Bk. 4, dist. 4, last qu.) calls it a religious
act for princes to compel unbelievers by threats and fears to receive
the faith, yet he seems to mean this to apply only to unbelievers who
in other respects are subjects of Christian princes (with whom we will
deal later on). Now, the Indians are not such subjects. Hence, I think
that Scotus does not make this assertion applicable to their case. It
is clear, then, that the title which we are now discussing is not adequate
and lawful for the seizure of the lands of the aborigines.
Another, and
a fifth, title is seriously put forward, namely, the sins of these Indian
aborigines. For it is alleged that, though their unbelief or their rejection
of the Christian faith is not a good reason for making war on them, yet
they may be attacked for other mortal sins which (so it is said) they
have in numbers, and those very heinous. A distinction is here drawn with
regard to mortal sins, it being asserted that there are some sins, which
are not against the law of nature, but only against positive divine law,
and for these the aborigines can not be attacked in war, while there are
other sins against nature, such as cannibalism, and promiscuous intercourse
with mother or sisters and with males, and for these they can be attacked
in war and so compelled to desist therefrom. The principle in each case
is that, in the case of sins which are against positive law, it can not
be clearly shown to the Indians that they are doing wrong, whereas in
the case of the sins which are against the law of nature, it can be shown
to them that they are offending God, and they may consequently be prevented
from continuing to offend Him. Further they can be compelled to keep the
law which they themselves profess. Now, this law is the law of nature.
Therefore. This is the opinion of the Archbishop of Florence (pt. 3, tit.
22, ch. 5, § 8), following Augustinus Anconitanus, and of Sylvester (under
the word Papa, § 7); and it is the opinion of Innocent in X,
3, 34, 8, where he expressly says: "I hold that if the Gentiles who
have no other law than the law of nature break that law, they can be punished
by the Pope. This is shown by the case of the men of Sodom, who were punished
by God (Genesis, ch. 19). Now, the judgments of God are examples
unto us, and so I do not see why the Pope, who is the vicar of Christ,
can not do this." This is what Innocent said. And on the same principle
the Indians can be punished by Christian princes under the authority of
the Pope.
16. I, however, assert the following proposition: Christian princes can not, even by the authorization of the Pope, restrain the Indians from sins against the law of nature or punish them because of those sins. My first proof is that the writers in question build on a false hypothesis, namely, that the Pope has Jurisdiction over the Indian aborigines, as said above. My second proof is as follows: They mean to Justify such coercion either universally for sins against the law of nature, such as theft, fornication, and adultery, or particularly for sins against nature, such as those which St. Thomas deals with (Secunda Secundae, qu. 154, arts. 11, 12), the phrase "sin against nature" being employed not only of what is contrary to the law of nature, but also of what is against the natural order and is called uncleanness in II Corinthians, ch. 12, according to the commentators, such as intercourse with boys and with animals or intercourse of woman with woman, whereon see Romans, ch. 1. Now, if they limit themselves to the second meaning, they are open to the argument that homicide is just as grave a sin, and even a graver sin, and, therefore, it is clear that, if it is lawful in the case of the sins of the kind named, therefore it is lawful also in the case of homicide. Similarly, blasphemy is a sin as grave and so the same is clear; therefore. If, however, they are to be understood in the first sense, that is, as speaking of all sin against the law of nature, the argument against them is that the coercion in question is not lawful for fornication; therefore not for the other sins which are contrary to the law of nature. The antecedent is clear from I Corinthians, ch. 5: "I wrote to you in an epistle not to company with fornicators," and besides "If any brother among you is called a fornicator or an idolater," etc.; and lower down: "For what have I to do to judge them also that are without?" Whereon St. Thomas says: "The prelates have received power over those only who have submitted themselves to the faith." Hence it clearly appears that St. Paul declares it not his business to pronounce judgment on unbeliev